We show that the setting up of general conditions on complementarity in absorptive capacity gives rise to different, if not opposite Nash equilibrium outcomes to those found when absorptive capacity is assumed to be determined only by the similarity of R&D orientations. Firms that cooperate in R&D can take full advantage of complementarity in R&D by adopting firm-specific R&D paths, which appears to contradict Kamien and Zang's (2000) findings, and so would contradict Weithaus' (2005) predictions. Oddly, firms competing in R&D cannot gain the most from the potential of complementarity in knowledge by not choosing firm-specific R&D approaches in equilibrium under even milder conditions, which is contrary to another prediction of the Kamien and Zang's and Weithaus' models.
Introduction
The notion of absorptive capacity is essential to understand knowledge spillovers between firms carrying out R&D and new knowledge acquisition Levinthal, 1989, 1990) . Absorptive capacity consists of a firm's capabilities of acquisition and assimilation of external knowledge and its transformation and exploitation capabilities. The absorptive capacity of a firm has two components related to knowledge sharing and knowledge diversity across individuals. The similarity and diversity of knowledge are critical determinants of learning.
Empirical evidence shows that complementarity between internal R&D and R&D from external sources has a relevant role in the absorption of knowledge that leaks out by firms that undertake R&D, and consequently in the innovative performance of firms (see e.g. Backmann et al., 2015) . Absorptive capacity and the relationship between absorptive capacity and cooperation have been examined by the management and organization literature (Mowery et al., 1996 (Mowery et al., , 1998 . R&D alliances and in-house R&D are usually viewed by this literature as complementary strategies rather than alternatives. The internal research process can be significantly improved by successful alliances, as useful new ideas are generated outside the organization.
However, the game-theoretical literature on R&D investment and absorptive capacity does not address the role played by the complementarity component of absorptive capacity in the selection of firms' R&D strategies, namely their R&D orientations and their levels of R&D investment (Kamien and Zang, 2000; Weithaus, 2005) . The theoretical economic literature on R&D, technological knowledge spillovers and absorptive capacity assumes that only the similarities in R&D approaches chosen by firms enhance the absorptive capacity of each firm by increasing the connectedness between firms.
In this paper we generalize the models of Kamien and Zang (henceforth KZ) and Weithaus by hypothesizing that the absorptive capacity of each firm is also affected by complementarity in knowledge. The similarity of knowledge and the variety of knowledge in absorptive capacity are in turn determined by firms' R&D orientations. The relevance of the predictions of KZ's and Weithaus' models might be undermined as their assumptions on absorptive capacity do not consider the effects of knowledge complementarity on the absorption of external R&D results and consequently on the innovative performance of firms.
The objective of our work is to assess the impact upon equilibrium outcomes of a firm's absorptive capacity with a complementarity component between own and external R&D. We would like to show the lack of robustness of the Nash equilibria in R&D approaches found in KZ's and Weithaus' models once absorptive capacity includes an additional component of complementarity.
We show that the setting up of general conditions on complementarity in absorptive capacity in those theoretical frameworks gives rise to different, if not opposite Nash equilibrium outcomes to those found when absorptive capacity is assumed to be determined only by the similarity of R&D orientations. Firms that cooperate in R&D can take full advantage of complementarity in R&D by adopting firm-specific R&D paths that enhance firms' capabilities to explore technological possibilities, which appears to contradict KZ's findings, and so would contradict Weithaus' predictions, according to which firms choose identical R&D paths. Oddly, firms competing in R&D cannot gain the most from the potential of complementarity in knoweldge by not choosing firm-specific R&D approaches in equilibrium under even milder conditions than in the former case of R&D cooperation, which is contrary to another prediction of the KZ's and Weithaus' models according to which firms choose idiosyncratic R&D approaches.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the hypotheses of the gametheoretical model are presented and the structure of the model is described. Section 3 presents the equilibrium results under R&D competition and R&D cooperation. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
Model
A simple duopoly model can be established to underline the role of complementarity between in-house R&D and external R&D in endogenous absorptive capacity and R&D investments. The timeline of the three-stage games of KZ and Weithaus that we adopt here is the following. In the first stage, the two firms choose simultaneously their R&D approaches and in the second stage their R&D investment levels. We consider two alternative versions of the model concerning firms' decisions on the two elements of every R&D strategy. That is, the choices of R&D orientations and R&D investment levels under competition and under cooperation. The output level of each duopolist is chosen non-cooperatively in the last stage of the game.
In this model, the absorptive capacity of a firm is given by two elements, the similarity in knowledge, and so connectedness between firms that undertake R&D as assumed in KZ and Weithaus, and the complementarity between own R&D and external R&D. One implication of the introduction of the complementarity hypothesis in absorptive capacity is that the innovative performance of a firm is expected to be higher than when absorptive capacity is only affected by the similarity in knowledge, for given choices of R&D orientations by firms.
A minimal setting change of the KZ's and Weithaus' models so that the positive effects of complementarity in absorptive capacity are taken into account is via the impact of R&D results on the innovative performance of each firm. In order to compare the equilibrium outcomes in our generalized framework with those obtained in the original models of KZ and Weithaus, it is enough to assume that the marginal productivity of a firm's own R&D results increases in the complementarity between R&D approaches of the competing firms in the product market.
The innovative performance of a firm is represented in this paper by the reduction of the unit cost of production of the firm resulting from investments in R&D as follows with , .
The effective level of R&D effort of firm , depends on its own R&D investment, and also on the R&D investment of the other firm, through knowledge spillovers. R&D activities are associated with positive spillovers. The knowledge of a firm leaks to its rival at an exogenous rate . The absorption of external knowledge by firm depends on the choices of R&D approaches, or technological distances and by firms and , respectively. The similarity of knowledge in the absorptive capacity of a firm is given by .
In this representation of a firm's effective R&D effort, the new element to theoretical literature is the additional component of absorptive capacity due to complementarity, . The complementarity of knowledge results from the adoption of different but related R&D approaches by firms and increases the innovative performance of firms. The existence of complementarity in absorptive capacity and its effects for firm performance is hypothesized here as follows: for , ,
if either or ;
(ii) if both and
The benefits of complementarity between internal and external R&D are realized only if firms choose specific R&D orientations, . The marginal productivity of a firm's own R&D in its effective R&D efforts do not change if firms fail to take advantage of the potential of complementarity in absorptive capacity by choosing identical R&D approaches, . In the symmetrical case in particular, for whereas is consistent with the idea that complementarity between own R&D and external R&D, if it exists, brings benefits to firms carrying out R&D.
In the next section, we address the question of whether, after making hypothesis (ii) in (2), a Nash equilibrium in the initial stage of a game with complementarity in absorptive capacity imply the full exploitation of the complementarity potential by firms, through the choice of idiosyncratic R&D approaches , or even the realization of some of this complementarity potential, by not selecting a purely broad R&D approach or anything close it.
Results
Here we focus our presentation and discussion on the equilibrium outcomes in the first stage of the game where companies choose independently or cooperatively their R&D orientations. The analytical deduction of the equilibrium outcomes is shown in the appendix of the paper.
A cooperative solution in the first stage of a game with complementarity in absorptive capacity is if , . Firms take full-advantage of this knowledge complementarity with the choice of firm-specific R&D orientations. The necessary condition for the existence of this symmetric equilibrium is , . At the margin, the contribution of greater variety brought by a more specific orientation has to outweigh the marginal cost of less similarity brought about by the choice of less technological proximity. The existence of sufficient complementarity in the model leads expectably to the emergence of a cooperative Nash equilibrium different from the one determined in the original KZ's and Weithaus' frameworks, that is, identical R&D orientations .
Let us now deal with competition in R&D. An identical perturbation as before, ,
, made in the initial assumptions of the KZ's or Weithaus' framework would not imply a similar equilibrium outcome when firms compete in R&D. Unexpectedly, the introduction of complementarity in absorptive capacity destroys the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium determined in the KZ's and Weithaus' models. A small perturbation , in any such framework is enough for the new equilibrium in R&D approaches to be . The necessary condition for the existence of the symmetric equilibrium is not satisfied since the positive direct effect of complementarity in absorptive capacity is completely dominated by the negative strategic effect in the neighborhood of , This means that each competitor faces a trade-off in its choice of a R&D approach between more exploration of technological possibilities and appropriability of own R&D on the one hand, and more assimilation and absorption of external knowledge on the other hand.
Thus, firms competing in R&D do not fully realize the potential of complementarity in absorptive capacity and prefer instead to adopt R&D orientations that are eventually more similar to each other than different. But there is still a worse scenario regarding absorptive capacity and its effects on the firm performance. In the Weithaus' framework extended with the complementarity hypothesis in absorptive capacity in (2), the only equilibrium when , , take small values is the choice of identical R&D approaches at the opposite extreme, , or a quite close to zero when the extent of technological spillovers is rather large. Oddly, firms competing in R&D realize virtually none of the technological possibilities existing in knowledge complementarity in this case.
Conclusion
The findings have implications for managerial decisions and economic theory regarding how innovative performance can be enhanced through the mediating role of absorptive capacity in knowledge spillover settings. Firms should seek to adopt R&D cooperation strategies if they want to take full advantage of the complementarity element in absorptive capacity and thereby improve their innovative performance. Otherwise, if they decide to compete in R&D, they risk taking little or no advantage of the potential offered by complementarity between internal and external sources of R&D.
. By continuity arguments regarding , this function will be also negative in the left-hand neighborhood of . In the extension of the Weithaus' model, however, a small variation for any , so that has as result equally small values, causes function to be all the way negative in the unit interval of R&D orientations for a low or medium . A critical value of such that takes values very close to zero only for rather high 's.
Let us now consider the cooperative game in and . In the second stage of the game, we deduct the optimal investment level , considering the symmetric case :
given common , which implies . In the first stage, putting this result into the objective function , we deduct the optimal value for R&D orientations in the symmetric case too:
given  , with and . This is equivalent to , so the first-order condition is .
Thus, is a cooperative solution under cooperative R&D only if for every  everywhere. Given that in the symmetrical case, and so the necessary condition for an equilibrium is . A sufficient condition for is , for every , which can be rewritten as . Note that the Nash equilibrium for the co-operative game of the models of KZ and Weithaus is also an equilibrium for the cooperative game with complementarity in knowledge given hypothesis (i) in (2), as .
